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I. INTRODUCTION
Decades of short-term thinking and regulatory fixes created the bewil-
deringly complex statutory and regulatory structures governing the giving
of personalized investment advice to retail customers.1  Although deeply
flawed, the current systems remain entrenched because of the difficulties
inherent in making radical alterations.2  Importantly, the current patch-
work systems do not seem to serve retail customers particularly well.  Re-
tail customers tend to make predictable and costly mistakes in allocating
their assets.3  Some of this occurs because many investors lack basic finan-
cial literacy.4  A recent study released by the staff of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) on financial literacy among in-
vestors (the “Literacy Study”) highlights some frightening findings.5  The
Literacy Study documents that many investors struggle to protect them-
1. For purposes of this Article, “retail customer” shall be defined as it is in section
913(g)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010: “a
natural person, or the legal representative of such natural person, who (A) receives personal-
ized investment advice about securities from a broker, dealer, or investment adviser; and (B)
uses such advice primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(g),
124 Stat. 1376, 1824-30 (2010) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(g)(2) (2012)).
2. See COMM. ON COMP. PRACTICES, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES 3 (1995), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/bkrcomp.txt (explaining that the Committee would not recreate the status quo and
lamenting that “the current compensation system is too deeply rooted to accommodate radi-
cal alteration in the near-term.”).
3. See, e.g., Andrea Frazzini & Owen A. Lamont, Dumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows
and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 299, 319 (2008) (concluding that
“individual investors have a striking ability to do the wrong thing.”).
4. OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF
STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS (2012), iii [hereinafter LITER-
ACY STUDY], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-
part1.pdf.
5. Id.
Fall 2014] The Fragmented Regulation of Investment Advice 49
selves against fraud and do not understand basic concepts such as diversifi-
cation, investment costs, inflation, or compound interest.6  Certain
subgroups, “including women, African-Americans, Hispanics, the oldest
segment of the elderly population, and those who are poorly educated,
have an even greater lack of investment knowledge than the general popu-
lation.”7  Much has been said about the role of financial literacy in protect-
ing investors.8  Investors may also be protected through legislation and
regulation.  Following the Great Depression, the federal securities laws
were enacted for precisely this purpose.9  But over time, the distinctions
that once existed between the different professionals offering different
forms of investment advice have disappeared, blurring the lines between
existing regulatory structures.
Amidst these muddled regulatory structures, many different persons
provide advice and growing ranks of self-described “financial advisers”
now profit from advising retail customers.  According to the Financial In-
dustry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), “financial adviser” and many
similar titles are simply “generic terms or job titles, and may be used by
investment professionals who may not hold any specific credential.”10  The
person behind the title may actually be a stockbroker, investment adviser,
insurance salesperson, accountant, lawyer, or some other financial profes-
sional—each of whom may owe different duties to the investor.11  In many
cases, a single financial adviser may wear several hats.  In each role, the
financial adviser owes different duties to retail customers depending on
the type of compensation being received, product sold, and locality.12  Re-
tail customers meet with financial advisers because they want personalized
6. Id. at viii.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV.
197 (2008) (describing the failures of the financial-literacy approach). Troublingly, many in-
vestors do not recognize their own financial illiteracy. These failures may occur because of
the Dunning-Krueger effect, which explains that people tend to grossly overestimate their
own knowledge because they lack the information and metacognitive skills necessary to rec-
ognize their deficits. See Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Why the Unskilled Are Unaware: Further
Explorations of (Absent) Self-Insight Among the Incompetent, 105 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 98, 99 (2008); Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and
Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated
Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1127 (1999). In 2012, the
FINRA Investor Education Foundation released its FINANCIAL CAPABILITY STUDY and
found, among other things, that despite “low levels of financial literacy . . . Americans tend to
have positively biased self-perceptions of their financial knowledge.” FIN. INDUS. REGULA-
TORY AUTH. INVESTOR EDUC. FOUND., FINANCIAL CAPABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: RE-
PORT OF FINDINGS FROM THE 2012 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CAPABILITY STUDY 29 (2013).
9. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 73-85 (1933).
10. Rules and Resources, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/Inves
tors/ToolsCalculators/ProfessionalDesignations/RulesandResources/ (last visited Oct. 4,
2014).
11. Id.
12. See infra Part III for a discussion of these differences.
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advice properly tailored to their situation.13  But retail customers do not
generally understand the different systems of oversight, different stan-
dards of care, or the associated legal implications.14  Instead, retail cus-
tomers simply expect that advice given will be in their best interest.15  This
expectation is misplaced—the law does not require that all financial advis-
ers provide advice in their clients’ best interests.16  To remedy this, many
advocates have pressed to hold certain financial advisers providing invest-
ment advice, Brokers17 and Advisers,18 to the same fiduciary standards.
Reflecting these efforts, Section 913 of Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)
contains a provision directing the Commission to study the standards for
providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail custom-
ers.19  After completing this study, the Commission’s staff recommended
establishing a uniform, albeit limited, fiduciary standard for advice about
securities to retail customers.20  But in the face of opposition, the Commis-
sion has not yet enacted a rule.
While more uniform standards for Brokers and Advisers would do
much good, insurance products like equity-indexed annuities blur the lines
13. See SEC STAFF, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS i
(2011) [hereinafter FIDUCIARY STUDY], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/
913studyfinal.pdf. For decades, financial services firms have advertised their services and
stressed that consumers should come to them for advice. See Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice
and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 756
(2012) (documenting that brokerage firms have long advertised that they provide personal-
ized advice). To be sure, if retail customers knew what products to buy, they would not need
to meet with investment professionals to buy it; online brokerages execute trades cheaply
and efficiently.
14. See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 13; see also Christine Lazaro, The Future of
Financial Advice: Eliminating the False Distinction Between Brokers and Investment Advisors,
87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 381, 411 (2013) (“More and more investors do not even realize that
there is a distinction between brokers and investment advisers.”).
15. See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 13.
16. Christine Lazaro, Fiduciary Duty - Now and in the Future, 17 No. 2 PIABA B.J.
129, 132 (2010) (“[T]he suitability standard requires that a recommendation merely be suita-
ble for a customer, not necessarily that it be in the customer’s best interest.”).
17. “Broker” is defined as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transac-
tions in securities for the account of others.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A). A “Dealer” is “any
person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities (not including security-based
swaps, other than security-based swaps with or for persons that are not eligible contract par-
ticipants) for such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(5)(A). For this Article, the term “Broker” encompasses those individuals acting as
both brokers and dealers, or those individuals commonly known as stockbrokers.
18. “Adviser” is defined in relevant part as “any person who, for compensation, en-
gages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as
to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securi-
ties.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).
19. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913, 124 Stat. 1376, 1824-30 (2010) (codi-
fied as 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012)).
20. See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 13, at ii.
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between securities and insurance products, presenting novel regulatory
challenges for the regulation of investment advice.21  With more than
$224.7 billion in asset-value as of 2012,22 equity-indexed annuity contracts
comprise a large class of financial products that do not fit neatly into pre-
existing legal and regulatory categories.23  Equity-indexed annuities have
also garnered complaints of abusive sales practices,24 alleging in particular
that sellers do not adequately explain these complicated products to pur-
chasers.25  Critics contend that the dazzling sales numbers have been
driven by “outsize commissions” funded by high surrender charges and
long asset lock-up provisions, which make the products less suitable for
seniors or others who need to be able to access their money in case of
emergencies.26  Responding to these concerns in 2008, Commission Chair-
man Christopher Cox noted that 45% of investor complaints involved se-
niors and that equity-indexed annuities were “among a handful of
products most often involved in senior investment fraud.”27
The need for competent investment advice has never been greater.
While persons of every generation seek advice, the increasingly vulnerable
Baby Boomer generation now controls approximately $13 trillion in
household investible assets.28  Complicating this issue, the investing and
retirement world has changed from traditional defined benefit pension
plans to defined contribution savings plans, such as 401(k) plans.29  As a
21. See Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, Securities Act Re-
lease Nos. 33-8996, 34-59221, 74 Fed. Reg. 3138-01, 8 (Jan. 8, 2009). The product has also
been known as a fixed indexed annuity. For ease of reference, this Article refers to the prod-
uct as an “equity-indexed annuity.” See Id.
22. INSURED RET. INST., IRI 2013 FACT BOOK 164 (12th ed. 2013) [hereinafter IRI
FACTBOOK].
23. With an equity-indexed annuity, the insurance company commits to credit the pur-
chaser an amount derived, in part, from some equity, bond, or other securities index’s future
performance. Id. at 11. In this sense, the product may be categorized as a derivative for retail
customers because it is a financial agreement between two parties, with the value of the
contract to be determined by something that occurs in the future. Robert O’Harrow, A Pri-
mer on Financial Derivatives, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2010, at A13. For a more detailed
description of an equity-indexed annuity, see infra Part IV(B).
24. See Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, supra note 21, at
10.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Chairman Cristopher Cox, Statement at Open Meeting on Equity-Indexed Annui-
ties (Jun. 25, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch062508cc_annuity.htm.
28. See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 13, at 93–94.
29. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 453
(2004) (“Pension cognoscenti have frequently remarked on the stagnation of defined benefit
pensions and the concomitant rise of defined contribution plans.”).
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result, Americans now find themselves making more investment decisions
without a pension plan to fall back on.30
This Article examines the different systems of oversight governing in-
vestment advice and argues that an Investment Advice Act focused on
harmonizing standards for investment advice is the best solution to ad-
dress the shortcomings of the existing regulatory systems.  Part II discusses
the existing statutory and regulatory structures and reviews the history of
securities and insurance regulation.  Part III examines the different stan-
dards of care that financial professionals may owe depending on the type
of product they sell and their relationship to the customer.  Part IV dis-
cusses equity-indexed annuities as an example of a product that has
blurred the boundaries between securities and traditional insurance prod-
ucts and the regulatory, judicial, and Congressional battles for supremacy.
Part V proposes a more elegant solution—reducing regulatory overlap by
empowering the Commission to regulate the giving of personalized retail
investment advice involving securities or insurance, generally.
II. THE CURRENT ARCHITECTURE
Different statutory and regulatory systems govern the interrelated se-
curities and insurance industries.  While the 2008 financial crisis exposed
just how interrelated these markets are today, the fragmented regulatory
architecture has not kept pace with financial innovation.  Part II describes
the existing dual federal and state system for securities regulation and the
state-centered scheme for insurance regulation to provide a foundation for
the proposed solution for regulating personalized retail investment advice.
A. Dual Federal & State Securities Regulation
1. Initial Regulation by the States and the Beginning
of Federal Regulation
Securities regulation within the United States began at the state level.
State laws creating liability for securities fraud, known as blue sky laws,
first appeared in the 1910s.31  In addition to requiring robust disclosures,
state blue sky laws also often regulated the quality of the securities offered
on a merit basis—giving state officials the power to examine whether the
securities were substantively suitable for sale.32  These new laws were ini-
tially controversial, but in 1917 the Supreme Court upheld state securities
statutes as constitutional in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., effectively recogniz-
30. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN
JOBS, FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE, AND RETIREMENT AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK, Ox-
ford, U.P. (2006), for a thorough discussion of the changing risk dynamics.
31. See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 279–80 (1998) (describing history of blue sky
laws); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 347, 359, 361 (1991) (describing the origin of state blue sky laws).
32. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 1.2[2] (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION].
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ing that states could validly regulate securities offerings occurring within
their borders.33  However, because securities could be sold in one state
and then mailed into another, states lacked any effective power to regulate
the national securities market.34  Even though most states soon passed
their own blue sky laws, state-by-state regulation proved ineffective.35
Federal securities regulation in the interest of consumer protection be-
gan only in the aftermath of the Great Depression.  In 1933, Congress
passed the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”).36  President
Franklin Roosevelt encouraged Congress to pass the legislation and add to
“the ancient rule of caveat emptor the further doctrine, ‘Let the seller also
beware.’”37  The law created a number of private remedies for investors
purchasing securities governed by the Securities Act and has been charac-
terized as the first true consumer protection law because it represented a
movement towards caveat vendor.38
Unlike state securities regulation, which would often include a merit
regulation component, the federal securities laws focus principally on dis-
closure.39  The Securities Act requires an issuer to fully disclose all mate-
rial facts about the offering so that investors may make their own decisions
about a particular security’s value.40  The federal securities laws apply to
products falling within their definition of security,41 which Section 2(a)(1)
of the Securities Act defines as including:
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, de-
benture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization cer-
tificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in
oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on
any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including
any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing . . . .42
33. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 539 (1917); see also Macey, supra note
31, at 388.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012)).
37. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
38. HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 32, § 1.2[3].
39. Id. at 35.
40. Id. § 1.2[3][A], at 36.
41. See Id. § 1.6[0]. (“The primary jurisdictional trigger for the federal securities laws
depends on the existence of a security.”).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
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This broad statutory definition reflects the expansive scope of federal
securities regulation.43
In applying the Securities Act’s definition, courts broadly construe the
term “investment contract.”  In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., the Supreme
Court defined the term “investment contract” as a “contract, transaction
or scheme whereby a person (i) invests his money (ii) in a common enter-
prise and (iii) is led to expect profits (iv) solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party.”44  This broad definition has been found to en-
compass many different types of schemes—including even the sale of
earthworms to be repurchased at a later date.45  Despite this broad defini-
tion and judicial willingness to apply the securities laws broadly, the Secur-
ities Act explicitly excludes certain investment contracts from the
definition of “security” under the Securities Act.  In particular, Section
3(a)(8) explicitly excludes “[a]ny insurance or endowment policy or annu-
ity contract or optional annuity contract, issued by a corporation subject to
the supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank commissioner, or any
agency or officer performing like functions, of any State or Territory of the
United States or the District of Columbia[.]”46  As discussed in greater
detail below, the scope of these exclusions has led to significant regulatory
boundary disputes.
Over time, the federal securities laws expanded to address the protec-
tion of investors and how national securities markets function.  Shortly af-
ter passing the Securities Act, Congress passed the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).  The Exchange Act created the Com-
mission and empowered it to regulate the national securities markets and
to police the behavior of Brokers and broker-dealers selling securities to
the investing public.47  In 1938, Congress tweaked the structure again and
passed the Maloney Act, amending the Exchange Act to allow self-regula-
tory organizations, such as FINRA, to assist the Commission in overseeing
Brokers and broker-dealers.48  In 1940, the Commission gained additional
oversight responsibilities for Advisers with the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 (the “Advisers Act”).49
Over the next several decades, Congress frequently amended the se-
curities laws, creating a patchwork of legislation.50  In the aftermath of the
43. See HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 32, § 1.6. Although the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 define the term “security” in slightly different
ways, the Supreme Court has interpreted the statutes’ definitions as “virtually identical.”
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335 (1967).
44. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
45. See, e.g., Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (2012).
47. See HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 32, § 1.2[3][B].
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2012).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2012).
50. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 57 (11th
ed. 2009) (“The 1934 Act has been frequently amended; indeed, it has become the Christmas
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2008 financial crisis, it adopted Dodd-Frank to “protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices.”51  Dodd-Frank is the most extensive
financial regulation ever adopted by Congress, and it dedicates Title IX to
investor protection and securities regulation.52  Among other things,
Dodd-Frank created the Office of the Investor Advocate and directed the
Commission to review and report on the standards of care for broker-
dealers and Advisers giving advice to retail customers.53  It also author-
ized—but did not require—the Commission to harmonize these standards
of care by imposing a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers.54
2. State Law Protections
Buttressing these overarching federal protections, states were also able
to continue to regulate the securities markets through the enactment of
blue sky laws.55  Like the federal securities laws, state blue sky laws regu-
late the issuance of securities, secondary market trading, and the activities
of broker-dealers and Advisers.56  Unlike the federal securities laws, states
securities acts often allow state regulators to analyze the merits of the in-
vestment before certain securities can be offered for sale within that
state’s borders.57  Although some federal securities laws preempt state se-
curities laws, expressly allowing for concurrent state regulation is the
norm.58  States retain significant authority over broker-dealer activities,
regulating their registration and enforcing anti-fraud provisions to police
their behavior.59  The federal securities laws also reserve regulation of
smaller Advisers to the states.60  In addition to explicit state statutory and
regulatory requirements, state common law also regulates securities pro-
fessionals.  While the law varies significantly from state-to-state, some
states, like California, impose a fiduciary duty on Brokers operating within
their jurisdiction.61  As discussed below, this standard may exceed stan-
tree on which Congress almost annually hangs a new ornament in the form of new
amendments.”).
51. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
52. HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 32, § 1.2[3][D][4] (“The Dodd-
Frank Act which spans six hundred pages is the most comprehensive financial regulation
every adopted by Congress, as measured by the number of subject, activities, and financial
institutions that are covered by the Act.”).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 8.1[1][A] (“[E]mphasis on federal law should not be taken to indicate, how-
ever, that the states do not play a significant role in regulating securities transactions.”).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 8.1[1][B], at 423.
58. Id. at 830–32.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 708
(1968); Hobbs v. Eichler, 164 Cal. App. 3d 174, 201 (1985) (“The relevant law is clear. ‘The
relationship between a broker and principal is fiduciary in nature and imposes on the broker
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dards imposed by federal law.  While the federal law definition of a secur-
ity controls the reach of the federal securities laws, states will sometimes
apply their own definition of the term in interpreting their own laws.62
B. Insurance Regulation, an Overview
In contrast to the dual state and federal regulation of the securities
industry, insurance has long been regulated by the states.  In 1851, New
Hampshire appointed the first state insurance commissioner.63  Other
states followed suit and within 20 years, every state had an insurance regu-
lator.64  In contrast, federal law has had limited application to insurance.
In 1868, the Supreme Court considered whether insurance regulation fell
within the federal government’s purview.65  In Paul v. Virginia, the Court
held that “[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of com-
merce . . . . They are not subjects of trade and barter offered in the market
as something having an existence and value independent of the parties to
them . . . . They are like other personal contracts between parties which
are completed by the signature and the transfer of the consideration.”66
The Court considered the contracts as local transactions, and as such, “the
Federal government can no more regulate the commerce of a State than a
State can regulate the commerce of the Federal government.”67  This deci-
sion found that insurance contracts fell outside the early Commerce
Clause interpretation and were left to state regulation.
1. Attempts at Federal Regulation of Insurance
Notwithstanding the Court’s view that insurance was a local transac-
tion, calls for federal regulation of the insurance industry increased in the
early 20th century.  In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt spoke in favor
the duty of acting in the highest good faith toward the principal.’”); E.F. Hutton & Co. v.
Weeks, 304 S.E.2d 420, 422 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (“The broker’s duty to account to its cus-
tomer is fiduciary in nature, resulting in an obligation to exercise the utmost good faith.”);
Roth v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659, 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
62. For example, some states and federal courts have applied the “risk capital” test to
identify securities under state law. See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811
(1961).  Most articulations of the test involve three elements: (1) the investment of money;
(2) in the risk capital of a scheme or enterprise; and (3) the expectation of a valuable benefit.
12 JOSEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 2:80 (2014). Conversely, Hawaii applies a different
articulation of the risk capital test which requires that the investor has no right to participate
in managing the common enterprise. See State v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105
(1971).
63. See FED. INS. OFFICE, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSUR-
ANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2013) [hereinafter FIO REPORT].
64. In 1871, there were 36 states, and each one had an insurance regulator. See id.
65. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
66. Id. at 183.
67. Id. at 183–84.
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of federal regulation of insurance.68  Contrary to the view of the Court,
President Roosevelt described the insurance industry as “national and not
local in its application” and explained that it “involves a multitude of
transactions among the people of the different States and between Ameri-
can companies and foreign governments.”69  In 1905, President Roosevelt
made a more urgent plea for federal regulation of the insurance industry:
There is need of a far stricter and more uniform regulation of the vast insur-
ance interests of this country. The United States should in this respect follow
the policy of other nations by providing adequate national supervision of com-
mercial interests which are clearly national in character . . . . That State super-
vision has proved inadequate is generally conceded. The burden upon
insurance companies, and therefore their policy holders, of conflicting state
regulations of many States, is unquestioned, while but little effective check is
imposed upon any able and unscrupulous man who desires to exploit the com-
pany in his own interest at the expense of the policy holders and of the public.
The inability of a State to regulate effectively insurance corporations created
under the laws of other States and transacting the larger part of their business
elsewhere is also clear. As a remedy for this evil of conflicting, ineffective, and
yet burdensome regulations there has been for many years a widespread de-
mand for Federal supervision.70
Shortly thereafter, Senator John Dryden of New Jersey introduced a
bill in the Senate to establish a Bureau of Insurance in the Department of
Commerce and Labor.71  This was one of several bills introduced between
1902 and 1906 providing for federal regulation of the insurance industry.72
None of the bills were passed, and the judiciary committees of both the
House of Representatives and the Senate concluded that the regulation of
insurance was beyond the power of Congress.73  Throughout the early
20th century, Congress repeatedly demonstrated its intent to avoid inter-
fering with state regulation of the insurance industry.  Federal bankruptcy
laws exempted insurance corporations from those who may become bank-
rupt.74  In 1933, when Congress passed the Securities Act, it explicitly ex-
68. FIO REPORT, supra note 63, at 13; see also United States v. S.-E. Underwriters
Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 592 n.13 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
69. FIO REPORT, supra note 63, at 13.
70. President Theodore Roosevelt, President’s Annual Message, 40 CONG. REC. 90, 95
(Dec. 5, 1905) (read by Charles G. Bennett, Sec’y of the United States Senate).
71. See FIO REPORT, supra note 63, at 13; see also S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S.
at 593 n.15 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
72. See, e.g., H.R. 7054, 58th Cong. (2d Sess. 1903); H.R. 13791, 58th Cong. (2d Sess.
1904); H.R. 16274, 58th Cong. (3d Sess. 1904); S. 7277, 58th Cong. (3d Sess. 1905); H.R.
15092, 59th Cong. (1st Sess. 1906); H.R. Res. 417, 59th Cong. (1st Sess. 1906); see also S.-E.
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 576 n.8 (Stone, J., dissenting).
73. See S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 576 (Stone, J., dissenting) (noting that the
House Committee specifically recognized the Supreme Court’s holding that insurance is not
commerce).
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1940) (deeming insurance corporations ineligible for voluntary
or involuntary bankruptcy); see also S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 593 n.15 (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
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cluded insurance companies under state supervision from the Act’s
scope.75  Congress once again exempted insurance companies supervised
by state authority from regulation as investment companies in 1940 when
it enacted the Investment Company Act of 1940.76
As the insurance industry grew, its relationship to the national econ-
omy also grew.  In 1944, the Supreme Court recognized this change in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, finding that the
insurance industry had a significant impact on interstate commerce and
echoed the tone struck by President Roosevelt 40 years earlier:
The modern insurance business holds a commanding position in the trade and
commerce of our Nation. Built upon the sale of contracts of indemnity, it has
become one of the largest and most important branches of commerce. Its total
assets exceed $37,000,000,000, or the approximate equivalent of the value of
all farm lands and buildings in the United States. Its annual premium receipts
exceed $6,000,000,000, more than the average annual revenue receipts of the
United States Government during the last decade. Included in the labor force
of insurance are 524,000 experienced workers, almost as many as seek their
livings in coal mining or automobile manufacturing. Perhaps no modern com-
mercial enterprise directly affects so many persons in all walks of life as does
the insurance business. Insurance touches the home, the family, and the occu-
pation or the business of almost every person in the United States.77
In South-Eastern, the Court reconsidered the same issue that it had
considered 76 years earlier in Paul v. Virginia: whether insurance fell
within the Commerce Clause.78  It concluded that Congress did have the
authority to regulate insurance, holding that, “[n]o commercial enterprise
of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been held to
be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause. We cannot make an exception of the business of insurance.”79
However, the decision did not lead to or directly involve federal regu-
lation of the insurance industry.  The Court considered the issue in the
context of an antitrust claim and whether the antitrust laws extended to
the insurance industry—which had previously been exempted from inter-
state commerce.  The United States had indicted the South-Eastern Un-
derwriters Association and others in the District Court for alleged
violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.80  The Court held that the Sher-
man Act did apply to the insurance industry, although nowhere in the stat-
ute did it explicitly state that it applied to insurance.81
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1934); see also S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 593
n.15 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
76. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(17), 80a-3(c)(3) (1940); see also S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n,
322 U.S. at 593 n.15 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
77. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 539–40.
78. See Id. at 533.
79. Id. at 553.
80. Id. at 534.
81. See Id. at 553–62 (explaining the Court’s reasoning for its holding).
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Despite the recognition of federal authority over insurance, the indus-
try remained largely a state regulatory concern.  Shortly after South-East-
ern, Congress acted quickly to ensure that the states retained regulatory
control over the insurance industry.82  Congress passed the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act,83 which provides in relevant part that “[n]o Act of Congress
shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by
any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”84
After the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, there were a number
of renewed attempts at federal regulation of the insurance industry.  Fol-
lowing waves of insurer insolvencies in the 1960s and again in the 1980s
and 1990s, bills were introduced calling for federal regulation.85  However,
again, the bills were not passed and insurance regulation remained wholly
with the states.  In 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(“GLBA”), which was meant to “provid[e] a prudential framework for the
affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other finan-
cial service providers . . . .”86  While GLBA permitted the creation of fi-
nancial holding companies, which contained insurance subsidiaries, GLBA
preserved the states’ authority to regulate the insurance subsidiary.87
Congress remained reluctant to interfere with the states’ autonomous reg-
ulation of the insurance industry.
A slight change occurred after the 2008 financial crisis.  In 2010, subti-
tle A of Title V of Dodd-Frank,88 entitled the Federal Insurance Office
Act, established the Federal Insurance Office (the “FIO”) in the U.S. De-
partment of the Treasury.89  Dodd-Frank has granted the FIO limited au-
thority to monitor the insurance industry, conduct studies, and make
recommendations.90  Currently, the FIO does not have any real regulatory
authority over the insurance industry and it has not yet called for compre-
hensive federal oversight.  In December 2013, the FIO issued a report,
pursuant to one of its mandates under Dodd-Frank, entitled “How to
Modernize and Improve the System of Insurance Regulation in the United
States,” which recognizes the inefficiencies and lack of uniformity inherent
in a state-based regulatory structure.91  However, the report does not view
the solution to the problem as one in which federal regulation displaces
82. See FIO REPORT, supra note 63, at 15; see also SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453,
458 (1969).
83. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006).
84. Id. § 1012(b); see also FIO REPORT, supra note 63, at 15.
85. See FIO REPORT, supra note 63, at 15.
86. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1338 (1999).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 6711 (2013).
88. 31 U.S.C. § 313 (2010).
89. 31 U.S.C. §§ 313-14 (2010).
90. E.g., FIO REPORT, supra note 63, at 2–3.
91. Id. at 65.
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state regulation.92  The report concludes that “the debate is best reframed
as one in which the question is where federal involvement is warranted,
not whether federal regulation should completely displace state-based
regulation.”93
Even after the financial crisis, Congress has continued to entrust regu-
lation of the insurance industry to the states.  While federal oversight has
slightly increased with Dodd-Frank, Congress has not chosen to vest any
federal agency with any real authority to enact rules or regulations gov-
erning the insurance activities of financial services firms.  It remains to be
seen whether any action will be taken following the recommendations of
the FIO.
2. State Regulation of Insurance
While Congress stayed out of the regulation of the insurance industry,
the states were quick to coordinate their efforts.  In 1871, the insurance
regulators of the 36 states were invited to participate in a meeting to dis-
cuss insurance regulation.94  Nineteen of the states sent representatives to
the inaugural meeting of the organization now known as the National As-
sociation of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) to discuss the impor-
tance of uniform regulation.95  The NAIC now coordinates state insurance
regulation, describing itself as “the U.S. standard-setting and regulatory
support organization created and governed by the chief insurance regula-
tors from the 50 states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. territo-
ries.”96  State insurance regulators are able to establish standards and best
practices, conduct peer reviews, and coordinate their regulatory oversight
through their participation in the NAIC.97  The NAIC develops model leg-
islation, rules, and regulations to coordinate regulatory policies among its
members.98
The NAIC has established procedures for developing new state model
regulations.  Its formal process, known as the Procedures for Model Law
Development, includes determining whether a proposed new model law or
regulation involves a national standard and/or requires uniformity among
all the states.99  Model law development also requires a commitment of
significant regulatory and NAIC resources to educate, communicate, and
92. See id. at 5.
93. Id. at 65.
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id.
96. About the NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS (Oct. 1, 2014, 5:08 PM),
http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm.
97. Id.
98. FIO REPORT, supra note 63, at 12; NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS, STATE-
BASED INSURANCE REGULATION: THE SYSTEM AT WORK, Association Profile (2013) availa-
ble at http://www.naic.org/annual_report_2013/2013_annual_report.pdf.
99. See NAIC Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS (Oct.
1, 2014, 5:30 PM), http://www.naic.org/documents/about_faq.pdf.
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support the model law’s implementation in the states.100  Even after a
model law is adopted by the NAIC, it must still be adopted by state legisla-
tures before it becomes effective, which is not done uniformly.101
Through this process, the NAIC has developed numerous model laws
and regulations on a comprehensive list of topics, including the Producer
Licensing Model Act, the Annuity Disclosure Model Regulation, the Vari-
able Life Insurance Model Regulation, the Suitability in Annuity Transac-
tions Model Regulation, and the Life Insurance Disclosure Model
Regulation.102
III. LAWS GOVERNING PERSONALIZED FINANCIAL ADVICE
Ordinary retail customers struggle to understand the basics of modern
finance, much less the complex web of interrelated state and federal laws
governing the securities and insurance industries.103  In general, the laws
governing personal financial advice focus on the product being sold and
the compensation structure of the advice giver.  These legal separations
can cause problems in some instances.  Most notably, insurance salesper-
sons may occasionally trespass into areas governed by the securities laws
by advising a person to sell securities to buy an insurance product.104  In
these instances, state regulatory agencies have brought enforcement pro-
ceedings to protect investors.105  Additionally, certain products, such as
variable annuities, are hybrid products—both securities and insurance
products.  Other products, such as equity-indexed annuities, are ambigu-
ous and may be a hybrid product or solely an insurance product depending
on how they are structured and marketed to customers.  Part III discusses
the standards applicable to individuals selling securities and insurance
products before tackling the issues that arise when products blur the line
between securities and insurance products.
A. Law Governing Advice about Securities
Today, different standards are applicable to persons giving personal-
ized financial advice about securities to retail customers.106  Because the
securities laws do not set forth an explicit standard of conduct applicable
to persons giving personalized financial advice about securities, distinct
standards have developed for Advisers and Brokers under the regulatory
100. See id.
101. FIO REPORT, supra note 63, at 12.
102. See NAIC Model Laws, Regulations and Guidelines, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMIS-
SIONERS (Oct. 1, 2014, 5:57 PM), http://www.naic.org/store_model_laws.htm.
103. See generally FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 13 (discussing, in the executive sum-
mary, the reasons that investors contact broker-dealers and investment advisers).
104. FIO REPORT, supra note 63, at 46.
105. See generally discussion infra at Part V.E.
106. See generally Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59 (2010)
(discussing different standards).
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structures governing each.107  Whether a person is considered an Adviser
or a Broker is often determined by the type of compensation the person
earns.108  The Advisers Act applies if the advice-giver receives fee-based
compensation directly related to the advice given, either hourly or as a
percentage of assets.109  The Exchange Act and FINRA rules apply if the
advice-giver receives a sales commission for transactions instead of advice-
based compensation.110
Adding to the complexity, many persons register as both Advisers and
Brokers.111  The duties they owe to a retail customer, then, will depend on
whether they provide advice to the customer as an Adviser or as a Broker.
In many instances, a single customer will have multiple accounts with the
same financial adviser, who may provide advice about one account as an
Adviser and advice about another account as a Broker.  Finally, the differ-
ences between Advisers and Brokers are material.  For one thing, Advis-
ers operate within a less structured and more principle-based
environment.  Each owes different duties, receives a different form of
compensation, and operates within different supervisory systems.
1. Personalized Financial Advice under the Advisers Act
Early regulation of investment advice was limited.  Before World War
I, a variety of different professionals gave advice about investing.112  After
the stock market crash of 1929, professionals focused on investment coun-
seling emerged.113  Only limited state regulation applied to their profes-
sion and few states even required them to register.114  After a period of
study, Congress enacted the Advisers Act in 1940 to regulate the profes-
sion and protect the reputation of bona fide investment advisers from the
stigma that would attach if they were associated with scoundrels.115
Today, Advisers provide personalized financial advice to ordinary
Americans in exchange for direct, fee-based compensation.  As a starting
point, the Advisers Act defines the term “investment adviser” to include:
[A]ny person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securi-
107. Id. at 64.
108. See Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 13, at 12 (“[A]pproximately 88% of investment ad-
viser representatives were also registered representatives of a FINRA registered broker-
dealer . . . .”).
112. See Laby, supra note 13, at 717.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 21 (1940).
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ties, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities . . . .116
The Advisers Act’s anti-fraud provision broadly prohibits any fraudu-
lent practice and makes it unlawful for any Adviser: “(1) to employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; [or]
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which op-
erates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client . . . .”117
In interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court declared that it im-
poses “‘federal fiduciary standards’ to govern the conduct of investment
advisers.”118  At the least, these fiduciary principles impose “an affirma-
tive duty of ‘utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material
facts,’ as well as an affirmative obligation ‘to employ reasonable care to
avoid misleading’ . . . clients.”119  In Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., the Supreme Court found that this
provision “reflects a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary
nature of an investment advisory relationship,’ as well as a congressional
intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which
might incline as investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to
render advice which was not disinterested.”120
The Commission has expounded on Advisers’ fiduciary duties and
made clear that the law, by judicial interpretation, imposes continuing du-
ties of loyalty and care.121  The duty of loyalty requires Advisers to act in
their clients’ best interests and disclose all conflicts of interest.122  The
duty of care requires Advisers to provide suitable investment advice after
investigating a customer’s financial situation and investment objectives.123
Nonetheless, the precise contours of an Adviser’s duty to recommend suit-
able securities are less clearly defined than the standards FINRA main-
tains for Brokers.124  No precise rule-based framework exists for
evaluating the suitability of an Adviser’s recommendations.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2. Although this broad definition would seemingly encompass
Brokers, the Advisers Act specifically excludes Brokers from its reach so long as: (i) their
performance of investment advisory services is “solely incidental” to their business as a bro-
ker; and (ii) the Broker receives no “special compensation” for providing investment advice,
e.g. a payment expressly for investment advice. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(c). For precedent on
the scope of the exclusion, see Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir.
2011).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6.
118. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979)
(quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471, n. 11 (1977)).
119. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
120. Id. at 191–92.
121. See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 13, at 22.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 27–28.
124. See James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-Based Analysis of the Legal
Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and A Framework for Enhanced In-
vestor Protection, 68 BUS. LAW. 1, 12–13 (2012).
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Advisers’ fee-based compensation may come as a flat charge, an hourly
rate, or, more commonly, as percentage of their clients’ asset value.125
Paying fees as a set percentage of assets-under-management has been
praised for removing an Adviser’s incentive simply to recommend prod-
ucts that pay greater commissions.126  An asset-based fee also incentivizes
Advisers to protect their clients’ assets from market downturns because a
reduction in their clients’ asset value reduces their compensation.127  Simi-
larly, Advisers benefit from increasing their clients’ asset value because
their compensation rises with their clients’ wealth.128
However, this compensation structure carries its own conflicts and
should not be viewed as a panacea.  An asset-based fee may incentivize an
Adviser to take imprudent risks with their clients’ assets to gain more fee
revenue.129  Advisers may also hesitate before recommending any transac-
tion that reduces a client’s assets-under-management—such as buying a
life insurance policy or an annuity which would result in less money for
Advisers to manage.130
Asset-based fees may be least appropriate for passive buy-and-hold re-
tail customers.  The Commission has expressed concern about a practice
dubbed “reverse churning.”131  An Adviser reverse churns an account
when the Adviser collects a fee for purportedly managing an account that
requires little or no management.132  In practice, dual-registered Advisers
may sign their former brokerage clients up for fee-based accounts for the
purpose of generating revenue for their firm while not providing a corre-
sponding benefit to their customer.133  FINRA has recognized that it “is
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade . . . to place a cus-
tomer in an account with a fee structure that reasonably can be expected
to result in greater cost than an alternative account offered by the member
that provides the same services and benefits to the customer.”134
125. See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 13, at 7, 10–11.
126. See Daisy Maxey, How to Pay Your Financial Adviser, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204554204577024152103830414.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Daisy Maxey, SEC Targets ‘Reverse Churning’ by Advisers, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24,
2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304610404579403251590760602.
132. See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 13, at 152.
133. See OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, EXAMINATION PRIORITIES FOR 2014 (Jan. 9, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2014.pdf.
134. NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, FEE-BASED COMPENSATION, NOTICE TO MEM-
BERS (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/
documents/notices/p003079.pdf.
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The Commission and the states share responsibility for policing Ad-
viser behavior.135  Although a number of exclusions and exceptions apply,
Advisers must register with the Commission if they: (i) manage certain
types of funds, such as pension funds; (ii) manage more than $100 million
in client assets; or (iii) work in a state that does not register Advisers.136
Advisers not meeting these thresholds must register with the states and
are prohibited from registering with the Commission.137
Advisers’ supervisory and regulatory oversight also differs depending
on whether they register with the Commission or with the states.  Advisers
registered with the Commission must comply with additional requirements
and are exempted from most state regulatory requirements.138  As inter-
preted by the Commission, the Advisers Act also regulates the manner in
which Advisers may advertise their services,139 requires Advisers to put in
place procedures “which would reasonably be expected to prevent and de-
tect” violations of the Advisers Act or regulations promulgated thereun-
der,140 and mandates that Advisers keep accurate books and records.141
State-registered Advisers must comply with any state-level requirements,
as well as the anti-fraud provisions of the Advisers Act.142
2. Advice under the Exchange Act
Modern brokerage firms differ substantially from the brokerage firms
of the 1930s.  Then, Brokers focused primarily on the complicated process
of order execution.143  Without computers to speed the process, Brokers
mainly delivered value by executing orders rather than giving advice about
investments.144  Their role has changed to focus more on giving invest-
ment advice as order execution has become increasingly automated.145
Like the Advisers Act, the Exchange Act also contains an anti-fraud pro-
vision which makes it unlawful “to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
135. See DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REGU-
LATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Mar. 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012
.pdf.
136. See Advisers Act § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); Advisers Act
§ 203A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
137. See REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS, supra note 135, at 8–11.
138. Id. at 11.
139. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (2014).
140. Advisers Act § 203(e)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(6) (2006).
141. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a) (2014).
142. See REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS, supra note 135, at 11.
143. See Laby, supra note 13, at 729–30.
144. See id.
145. Id.
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for the protection of investors.”146  The Commission promulgated Rule
10b-5, which broadly prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities.147  However, unlike the Advisers Act, courts have held
that this section of the Exchange Act does not establish a fiduciary
duty.148
A Broker’s obligations are defined by FINRA Rules, FINRA Enforce-
ment decisions, and SEC Enforcement decisions.  The SEC has delegated
much of its oversight responsibility of Brokers and brokerage firms to
FINRA.  When giving personalized financial advice, Brokers and broker-
age firms must “observe high standards of commercial honor and just and
equitable principles of trade.”149  More specifically, FINRA Rule 2111
(the “Suitability Rule”) governs the investment recommendations a Bro-
ker makes to a customer.  The Suitability Rule provides that:
A member or an associated person must have a reasonable basis to believe
that a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or
securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information obtained
through the reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to ascer-
tain the customer’s investment profile. A customer’s investment profile in-
cludes, but is not limited to, the customer’s age, other investments, financial
situation and needs, tax status, investment objectives, investment experience,
investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any other infor-
mation the customer may disclose to the member or associated person in con-
nection with such recommendation.150
Although it articulates clear duties, the Suitability Rule does not ex-
plicitly provide that a Broker’s recommendations must be in the cus-
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
147. Rule 10b-5 states: “It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.”
148. With respect to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the courts have determined
that because scienter is a necessary element to find a violation of the section, the section does
not confer a fiduciary duty on Brokers.  As explained by the Supreme Court, “Section 10(b)
makes unlawful the use or employment of ‘any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance’ in contravention of Commission rules.  The words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in
conjunction with ‘device or contrivance’ strongly suggests that § 10(b) was intended to pro-
scribe knowing or intentional misconduct.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197,
(1976).
149. FINRA Manual, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., Rule 2010, http://finra.compli
net.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=5504.
150. FINRA Manual, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., Rule 2111(b), http://finra.
complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859&print=1.  (A
“member” is a broker-dealer and an “associated person” is a Broker).
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tomer’s best interests.151  Nonetheless, FINRA Enforcement decisions
and guidance materials have made clear that “a broker’s recommenda-
tions must be consistent with his customers’ best interests.”152
Absent special circumstances, these specific obligations only attach if
and when the Broker gives investment advice.153  In some cases, a contin-
uing duty to monitor a customer’s account may arise if the Broker gains
discretionary control over the account or state common law imposes a fi-
duciary duty.154  For customers, this means that the Broker owes them
duties when making a recommendation, but does not generally have any
duty to continue to oversee their accounts.  Brokers giving personalized
financial advice under the Exchange Act do so in exchange for sales com-
missions in connection with a transaction.155  Absent some transaction, a
Broker does not receive any compensation.  However, the compensation
received is incidental to the advice given; otherwise, the Broker would be
considered an Adviser under the Advisers Act.156
Even though the law requires Brokers to only recommend suitable
products, financial incentives produced by commission-based compensa-
tion may distort Brokers’ advice.  Notably, the amount of a Broker’s com-
pensation may vary depending on the product she buys or sells for the
customer.  This compensation structure has caused many to worry that
Brokers may not provide objective advice.157  For instance, when deciding
between two similar and suitable products, Brokers have a financial incen-
tive to recommend the higher-commission product.  In 1995, the Commis-
sion released the Report of the Committee on Compensation Practices,
which recognized that paying Brokers more money for selling one product
over another raised questions as to whether a Broker rendered “objective
advice or simply maximize[ed] commission income.”158  FINRA echoed
these concerns in 2013 when it released a report on conflicts of interest,
151. Lazaro, supra note 16, at 132 (“[T]he suitability standard requires that a recom-
mendation merely be suitable for a customer, not necessarily that it be in the customer’s best
interest . . . .”).
152. See Wrona, supra note 124, at 19 (collecting sources).
153. For a discussion of circumstances where Brokers may owe ongoing fiduciary du-
ties, see Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary Duty & Investment Advice: Will an Uniform Fiduci-
ary Duty Make a Material Difference?, J. BUS. & SEC. L. (forthcoming).
154. Id.
155. See Wrona, supra note 124, at 5–6 (discussing fee structures).
156. Brokers and dealers are not subject to the requirements of the Advisers Act where
their investment advice is (1) “solely incidental to the conduct of [their] business as a broker
or dealer,” and (2) the broker or dealer “receives no special compensation therefor.” 15
U.S.C. § 80b–2(a)(11)(C) (2000). Fin. Planning Ass’n v. S.E.C., 482 F.3d 481, 483 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
157. See Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers As Fiduciaries, 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 439, 448
(2009) (questioning the wisdom of differential commissions).
158. COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES 8 (1995), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/bkrcomp.txt.
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praising broker-dealer efforts to mitigate the financial incentive to recom-
mend one product over another.159
To manage these conflicts of interest, FINRA requires brokerage firms
to closely supervise Brokers to ensure that customers receive suitable rec-
ommendations.160  In particular, FINRA requires broker-dealers to create
a supervisory hierarchy and certify that they have put in place “processes
to establish, maintain, review, test and modify written compliance policies
and written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to achieve com-
pliance with applicable FINRA rules, MSRB rules and federal securities
laws and regulations . . . .”161  Numerous specific requirements exist to
ensure that brokerage firms satisfy their supervisory obligations.  FINRA
requires that Brokers pass licensing examinations to demonstrate their
competence and receive continuing education about “compliance, regula-
tory, ethical and sales-practice standards.”162  To ensure that recommen-
dations fit a customer’s needs, FINRA’s “Know Your Customer” rule
requires that Brokers and brokerage firms “use reasonable diligence, in
regard to the opening and maintenance of every account, to know (and
retain) the essential facts concerning every customer.”163  FINRA claims
that effective supervision within this system “is the foundation of ensuring
investor protection and market integrity.”164
B. Rules Applicable to Personalized Financial Advice about Insurance
In the insurance context, retail customers receive personalized finan-
cial advice from state insurance agents, also known as “Producers.”165
These Producers often serve as a retail customer’s most significant contact
with the insurance industry.  Because insurance is regulated at the state-
level, insurance regulation varies substantially state-by-state, making it dif-
ficult to describe a Producer’s duties to a customer with precision.166
When a Producer sells an insurance product, state insurance departments
determine what duties apply based on the statutes in place.  These duties
also vary depending on the insurance product being sold to the customer.
159. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 26–30
(Oct. 2013), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/docu
ments/industry/p359971.pdf.
160. See Wrona, supra note 124, at 37.
161. FINRA Manual, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., Rule 3130(b), http://finra.com
plinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6286.
162. FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 13, at 77.
163. FINRA Manual, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., Rule 2090, http://finra.compli
net.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9858.
164. Id. 3130.03.
165. For this Article, a Producer is defined as an insurance “agent or broker who mar-
kets, distributes or sells an insurance product to a consumer.” FIO REPORT, supra note 63, at
46.
166. Id.
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For the purposes of this Article, Part III primarily focuses on the Pro-
ducer’s duties when selling annuities.
In 2000, the NAIC adopted a white paper recommending the establish-
ment of suitability standards for life insurance and annuities.167  At the
time, six states had broad suitability standards for annuity products.168
These states prohibited Producers from recommending a product with rea-
sonable grounds to believe the product was unsuitable for the customer.169
Some states provided guidance on how to determine suitability, basing it
on an inquiry into criteria such as the customer’s objectives, financial situ-
ation, and needs.170  Yet most states lacked suitability requirements.171
After adopting the white paper, the NAIC also appointed a working group
to draft a model act and regulation.172 The wide-reaching standard in the
original formulation, however, was met with little support.173  The work-
ing group then redrafted the model regulation to impose a more limited
standard and to apply only to the sale of annuities to seniors, resulting in
the “Senior Protection in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation.”174  In
2006, the NAIC expanded the scope of the model regulation to apply to all
annuity transactions, and it was renamed the Suitability in Annuity Trans-
actions Model Regulation (the “Model Regulation”).175
The Model Regulation is similar to the FINRA suitability standard.  It
requires that the Broker or Producer have “reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that the recommendation is suitable for the consumer on the basis of
the facts disclosed by the consumer as to his or her investments and other
insurance products and as to his or her financial situation and needs, in-
cluding the consumer’s suitability information.”176  In addition, the Bro-
ker or Producer must have a reasonable basis for believing that the
consumer has received specific information about the annuity, and that
particular aspects of the annuity are suitable for the consumer.177  The
Model Regulation defines “suitability information” to include the follow-
ing: (1) age; (2) annual income; (3) financial situation and needs, including
167. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, SUITABILITY OF SALES OF LIFE INSURANCE AND
ANNUITIES, (June 2000) [hereinafter NAIC WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.naic.org/
store/free/SOS-LI.pdf. See also, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, SUITABILITY IN ANNUITY
TRANSACTIONS MODEL REGULATION, LH-275-1 (April 2010), [hereinafter NAIC MODEL
REGULATION] available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-275.pdf.
168. See e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-15.8 (2011); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 40-2-
14(c)(5) (2014); MINN. STAT. § 60K.14 (2011); MINN. STAT. § 72A.20 (2014); WIS. ADMIN.
CODE INS. § 2.16(6) (2014). NAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 167, at 10–14.
169. NAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 167, at 11–14.
170. Id.
171. NAIC MODEL REGULATION, supra note 167, at LH-275-1.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. NAIC MODEL REGULATION, supra note 167, § 6.A.
177. Id. § 6.A(1)–(4).
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the financial resources used for the funding of the annuity; (4) financial
experience; (5) financial objectives; (6) intended use of the annuity; (7)
financial time horizon; (8) existing assets, including investment and life
insurance holdings; (9) liquidity needs; (10) liquid net worth; (11) risk tol-
erance; and (12) tax status.178
There is substantial variation in the adoption of the Model Regulation.
Some states have adopted the duties found in the Model Regulation.179
Several states have adopted the duties found in a prior version of the
Model Regulation, which define the information that must be considered
in determining the suitability of the transaction less specifically and re-
quire less disclosure about the annuity.180  One state adopted the original
version of the Model Regulation as it applied only to senior consumers,181
and other states have adopted some variation of a suitability standard.182
Only New Mexico has not adopted any suitability standards to govern an-
nuity sales.183
States generally require Producers to be licensed and to register.  Even
though states share information with each other, each state independently
licenses the Producers operating within its territory.184  In 2013, the Na-
tional Insurance Producer Registry (“NIPR”), a non-profit associated with
178. Id. § 5.I
179. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 26.775 (2011); CAL. INS. CODE § 10509.914 (West
2011); COLO. CODE REGS. § 702-4:4-1-11 (2011); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-432a-5
(2012); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 26-A, § 8403 (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4554 (West 2013);
2012-9 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 608-610 (LexisNexis); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r.
18.01.09.015 (2013); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 3120.50 (2011); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-
15.75(507B) (2012); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 40-1-14a (2013); 806 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 12:120
(2012); MD. CODE REGS. 31.09.12.04 (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.4155 (West
2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.2032 (West 2013); 19-2 MISS. CODE R. § 18.06 (West 2013);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-8106 (2012); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:4-59A.3 (2013); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 224.4 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-34.2-03 (2011); OHIO
ADMIN. CODE 3901-6-13 (2011); OR. ADMIN. R. 836-080-0180 (2011); 11-5 R.I. CODE R.
§ 12:6; S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 69-29 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33A-16 (2012); TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 1115.051 (West 2011); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 590-230 (2012); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 284-23-390 (2012); W. VA. CODE R. § 114-11B-5 (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 628-347 (West 2012).
180. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 482-1-137-.06 (2006); 054-00-082 ARK. CODE R. § 6 (Lexis-
Nexis 2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1243.03 (LexisNexis 2014); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-
94.06 (2006); 760 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-72-4 (2009); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37, § 11711 (2014);
211 MASS. CODE REGS. 96.06 (2014); 02-031-917 ME. CODE R. § 6 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN.
§33-20-805 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-60-170 (2009); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. Ins.
305.05 (2009); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 365:25-17-7 (2006); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 627-3
(2010); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0780-01-86-.06 (2008); 14 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-45-40
(2007).
181. 18 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 1214-6.0 (2014).
182. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §4724(16) (2007); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 700-1.146
(2007); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 688A.455 (2006); 44-27 WYO. CODE R. § 11 (LexisNexis 1996).
183. The NAIC tracks adoption of the Model Regulation, and its information indicates
that New Mexico has not adopted the Model Regulation. NAIC MODEL REGULATION, supra
note 167, at LH-275-6.
184. NAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 167, at 2.
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the NAIC, included registration information for 2.3 million individuals
holding more than six million state-issued licenses.185  Like Brokers, Pro-
ducers are generally paid a commission for selling annuities.  However, the
commission is usually paid by the insurance company issuing the annuity
as part of the company’s overall expenses and is built into the annuity’s
expenses.186
IV. FINANCIAL INNOVATION CHALLENGES THE
STOVEPIPE REGULATORY STRUCTURES
Financial and technological innovation has radically changed the world
of investing.  While the roles of Brokers, Advisers, and Producers have
changed, so too have the products they sell.  To show the need for more
uniform standards for persons giving personalized financial advice across
the securities and insurance industries, we spotlight the issues created by
just one novel product—equity-indexed annuities.  Increasingly complex
financial products like equity-indexed annuities demonstrate the need for
more coherent regulation.
A. From Ancient to Modern Annuities
Annuities have a long history: during the Roman Empire, Roman citi-
zens would have contracts known as annua to which they would make a
one-time payment in exchange for income payments received once a year
for the rest of their lives.187  Today, an annuity is defined as a contract
between a person and an insurance company to protect against the risk of
outliving savings.188  In exchange for a payment or series of payments, the
insurance company agrees to make periodic payments to the person on
whose life the contract is based, known as the annuitant, beginning imme-
diately or at some point in the future for a set number of years or until the
annuitant dies.189
Over time, annuities have grown more complex.  Importantly, not all
annuities begin to pay the annuitant immediately.  When payments to the
annuitant start immediately, the product is known as an immediate annu-
185. See NAT’L INS. PRODUCER REGISTRY, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2013), available at
http://www.nipr.com/docs/annual-reports/2013-nipr-annual-report.pdf.
186. See Facts About Annuities – Edition 1, NAT’L ASS’N FOR FIXED ANNUITIES, http://
fixedannuityfacts.com/tips (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); see also Variable Annuities: What You
Should Know, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/varannty.htm
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (“Profit from the mortality and expense risk charge is sometimes
used to pay the insurer’s costs of selling the variable annuity, such as a commission paid to
[the] financial professional for selling the variable annuity to [the customer].”).
187. IRI FACTBOOK, supra note 22, at 27.
188. Annuities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/annuity.htm
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014) [hereinafter SEC Annuities].
189. Id.
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ity.190  When income payments will begin at some future point, the prod-
uct is known as a deferred annuity.191  Deferred annuity contracts have
two phases, the first being an accumulation or savings phase, and the sec-
ond being a payout or income phase.192  Deferred annuity contracts offer
retail customers a way to accumulate savings on a tax-deferred basis.193
For annuities purchased with after-tax funds, this means that interest, divi-
dends, and capital gains will not be taxed until the funds are withdrawn
from the annuity contract.194  The value of this benefit increases with time
because money not paid out in taxes may earn more interest within the
annuity contract.
During the savings phase, the funds within a deferred annuity contract
may change in value.  For a fixed annuity, the insurance company guaran-
tees at least a certain minimum rate of investment return.195  The insur-
ance company also commits to pay a certain amount per dollar value of
the account per year if the contract holder elects to annuitize, or in other
words move into the payout phase and begin receiving periodic pay-
ments.196  Fixed annuities are regulated solely at the state-level and are
explicitly exempted from registration under the Securities Act.197
With a variable annuity, the funds in the contract change value differ-
ently.  After placing funds within a variable annuity contract, the retail
customer is offered a variety of different options in which to invest her
premium payments.  The amount accumulated depends on the perform-
ance of the investment options.  The retail customer may make or lose
money depending on the performance of the investment options chosen.
Accordingly, the contract value and the income payments are not guaran-
teed—they are variable.198
The federal securities laws apply to variable annuities.  As a variable
annuity’s assets are ultimately invested in securities and exposed to risk,
the offer and sale of variable annuities fall squarely within the jurisdiction
190. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., VARIABLE ANNUITIES: BEYOND THE HARD
SELL 1 (2012), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/investors/@inv/documents/inves
tors/p125846.pdf.
191. Id.
192. IRI FACTBOOK, supra note 22, at 29.
193. Id. Deferring taxes until a later date allows an investor to make substantial addi-
tional returns.
194. IRI FACTBOOK, supra note 22, at 77.
195. SEC Annuities, supra note 188.
196. Id.
197. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (2012) (exempting annuity and optional annuity con-
tracts from the 1933 Act when subject to state insurance laws).
198. Some variable annuities offer “riders” which provide guarantees as to minimum
contract values and income payments. These riders are offered for a fee and guarantee that
the customer will receive a minimum amount back regardless of the performance of the in-
vestment options chosen for the premium payments. See SEC Annuities, supra note 188.
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of the Commission and FINRA.199  As hybrid insurance products, state
insurance regulators also enjoy jurisdiction over variable annuity
products.200
B. Equity-Indexed Annuities
Insurance companies quietly introduced a new breed of annuity, the
equity-indexed annuity, in the mid-1990s.201  These products credit con-
tract owners with returns based on the performance of some index, such as
the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  Because the products
were most often tied to equity market indexes, they were first known as
equity-indexed annuities.202  The products share characteristics with both
fixed and variable annuities.203  Like a fixed annuity, equity-indexed annu-
ities may offer a minimum guaranteed interest rate and, under state insur-
ance law, the insurance company will guarantee the equity-indexed
annuity’s contract value up to the principal amount.204  Like a variable
annuity, the rate of return for an equity-indexed annuity will vary based
on the performance of a securities index, such as the S&P 500 or the Dow
Jones Industrial Average.205
Unlike variable annuities, however, equity-indexed annuities typically
do not diminish in value if a market index declines in value over a set
period.206  If the relevant index goes down during the relevant time pe-
riod, no deduction is taken from the value of the annuity.207  In exchange
for this downside protection, some equity-indexed annuities cap the
amount that may be earned when the index’s value goes up.  For example,
if an index increased 6% in a year, the equity-indexed annuity might only
permit a maximum rate of return of 5%.208  Forecasting anticipated re-
turns may be difficult because the insurance companies selling equity-in-
199. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (“VALIC”);
see also SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 204 (1967).
200. See Variable Annuities, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS (Oct. 27, 2014), avail-
able at http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_variable_annuities.htm.
201. Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, supra note 21, at 8.
202. The products are also known and currently branded as “fixed-indexed annuities.”
This Article refers to them as equity-indexed annuities because the Commission and FINRA
both refer to them as equity-indexed annuities and because their returns are generally de-
rived from an equity index, not a fixed index.
203. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., EQUITY-INDEXED ANNUITIES: A COMPLEX
CHOICE 2 (2012), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/investors/@inv/@protect/@ia/
documents/investors/p125847.pdf.
204. See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
205. Id. at 169.
206. SEC Annuities, supra note 188, at 13.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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dexed annuities generally reserve the right to alter the formulas by which
the investor’s gains will be calculated.209
Like most deferred annuities, equity-indexed annuities typically do not
charge retail investors any up-front fee on the purchase date.210  This does
not mean, however, that an investor cannot lose money with an equity-
indexed annuity.  Most contracts include “surrender fees,” which must be
paid if the annuity contract owner decides to cancel the contract before a
certain amount of time has passed.211  Many surrender fee provisions be-
gin in a range of 5% to 7% and gradually diminish the longer the investor
holds the equity-indexed annuity.212  However, some deferred annuities
charge surrender fees of up to 25% for early termination.213
C. The Regulatory Controversy
Equity-indexed annuities have been regulated by both insurance and
securities regulators.214  While the regulatory history of variable dates
back to the 1950s,215 insurance companies for the most part have quietly
sold equity-indexed annuities since their introduction in the mid-1990s
without registering them as securities.216  As insurance companies have
developed new products, the state insurance regulators and the SEC have
adapted their rules to keep pace with the innovation.217  However, contro-
versy exists over whether the federal securities laws or state insurance laws
should be applied to regulate equity-indexed annuity sales.  Most tradi-
tional annuities fall outside the securities laws, and the Securities Act ex-
pressly disavows insurance regulation, stating that the provisions of the
Act do not apply to “[a]ny . . . annuity contract or optional annuity con-
tract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance
commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer performing
like functions, of any State or Territory of the United States or the District
of Columbia.”218  Equity-indexed annuities, however, have sparked regu-
209. Crediting formulas typically limit the amount of interest credited by imposing a
variety of terms. A “participation rate,” for example, limits the investor to a certain percent-
age of the index’s performance. Some equity-indexed annuities may also cap the amount of
interest an investor may receive in any given year. See EQUITY-INDEXED ANNUITIES: A COM-
PLEX CHOICE, supra note 203, at 2.
210. IRI FACTBOOK, supra note 22, at 34.
211. Id. at 35.
212. Id.
213. Beware of Unsuitable Investments for Seniors, OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN. LORI SWAN-
SON, http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/ylr/annuitiesunsuitableinvforseniors.asp (last vis-
ited Jan. 8, 2015).
214. See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
215. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 70 (1959).
216. See Id. at 13; Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, supra
note 21, at 9.
217. See, e.g., Am. Equity, 613 F.3d.
218. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (2012).
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latory controversy largely because of the difficulty fitting these products
into existing classifications.
1. Defining and Regulating Annuities
As discussed above, the Securities Act excluded annuities from its
scope.219  But this did not mean that variable annuities could not be regu-
lated as securities.  The Supreme Court first considered what Congress in-
tended when it included the term “annuity contract” in the Securities Act
in 1959 in SEC v. VALIC.220  In VALIC, the Court considered whether a
variable annuity subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner
of any State were exempt from the Securities Act and held that they were
not exempt.
At the time VALIC was decided, variable annuities were new prod-
ucts.  Because the first variable annuity contract appeared in 1952,221 they
did not exist when the Securities Act was adopted in 1933.  The Court
expressed a reluctance to disturb state regulation either through displace-
ment or by superimposing federal requirements because “[w]hen the
States speak in the field of ‘insurance,’ they speak with the authority of a
long tradition.”222  However, the Court had to decide what Congress
meant when it used the term “annuity” in the Securities Act, at a time
when only fixed annuities had existed.223  States treated variable annuities
inconsistently, with some states treating variable annuities as insurance
and others not.224  The Court examined the characteristics of the variable
annuity contracts to determine whether they shared traditional insurance
characteristics.225  Historically, the annuities that had been regulated
under the insurance laws had been fixed annuities, which did share the
traits of traditional insurance products.226  In determining whether varia-
ble annuities should be treated in the same fashion as fixed annuities, the
Court concluded that “the concept of ‘insurance’ involves investment risk-
taking on the part of the company.”227  Nevertheless, “absent some guar-
antee of fixed income, the variable annuity places all the investment risks
on the annuitant, none on the company.”228  Accordingly, the Court held
that variable annuities were not exempted from the Securities Act.229
219. See HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 32, § 1.2[3][A].
220. See Variable Annuity, 359 U.S. at 65.
221. Id. at 69.
222. Id. at 68.
223. See id. at 69.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 71–73.
226. Id. at 69.
227. Id. at 71.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 73.
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Over time, the insurance companies continued to develop new annuity
products.  In 1967, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a flex-
ible-fund annuity was subject to the Securities Act in SEC v. United Bene-
fit Life Ins. Co.230  The flexible-fund annuity was an optional annuity plan
which was similar to a variable annuity.231  In this case, the Court focused
less on the shifting of risk and more on “the character the instrument is
given in commerce.”232  The Court examined how the flexible funds were
being sold to consumers and found that flexible funds were competing
with mutual funds and being sold to consumers under the same value pro-
position of growth and professional management as mutual funds.233  In
the view of the Court, “[i]t seems eminently fair that a purchaser of such a
plan be afforded the same advantages of disclosure which inure to a mu-
tual fund purchaser under §5 of the Securities Act.”234  Thus, the Court
held that the annuities were not exempt annuity contracts under the Se-
curities Act.235
In the mid-1980s, the SEC promulgated Rule 151 to create a safe har-
bor definition of annuity contracts or optional annuity contract under
§3(a)(8) of the Securities Act for new products entering the market.236
The rule was meant to ensure guaranteed investment contracts were ex-
empt from the definition as long as certain conditions were met.237  Under
Rule 151, a contract qualifies for the exemption provided:
(1) The annuity or optional annuity contract is issued by a corporation (the
insurer) subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank com-
missioner, or any agency or officer performing like functions, of any State or
Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia;
(2) The insurer assumes the investment risk under the contract as prescribed
in paragraph (b) of this section; and
(3) The contract is not marketed primarily as an investment.238
Rule 151 also provides the parameters that must be met for the insurer
to have adequately assumed the investment risk:
(1) The value of the contract does not vary according to the investment expe-
rience of a separate account;
(2) The insurer for the life of the contract
(i) Guarantees the principal amount of purchase payments and interest
credited thereto, less any deduction (without regard to its timing) for
sales, administrative or other expenses or charges; and
230. United Benefit, 387 U.S. at 202.
231. Id. at 204.
232. Id. at 211.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 212.
236. 17 C.F.R. § 230.151 (2013).
237. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
238. 17 C.F.R. § 230.151(a).
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(ii) Credits a specified rate of interest (as defined in paragraph (c) of this
section to net purchase payments and interest credited thereto; and
(3) The insurer guarantees that the rate of any interest to be credited in ex-
cess of that described in paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section will not be modi-
fied more frequently than once per year.239
Rule 151 codified the Court’s holdings in VALIC and United Benefit
by specifying that the insurance company must assume the investment risk
under the contract and that marketing the annuity as an investment will
forfeit the Securities Act exemption.
2. The SEC Moves to Regulate Equity-Indexed Annuities
In 2007, the Commission sought to regulate equity-indexed annuities
by proposing Rule 151A, which would make it clear that the products fell
outside the safe harbor of Rule 151 and within the Commission’s jurisdic-
tion.240  In 2009, the Commission’s rulemaking process concluded and it
adopted Rule 151A, which excluded from the definition of “annuity con-
tracts or optional annuity contracts,” any contract which:
(1) . . . specifies that amounts payable by the issuer under the contract are
calculated at or after the end of one or more specified crediting periods, in
whole or in part, by reference to the performance during the crediting period
or periods of a security, including a group or index of securities; and
(2) Amounts payable by the issuer under the contract are more likely than
not to exceed the amounts guaranteed under the contract.241
Shortly after the Commission adopted Rule 151A, American Equity
Investment Life Insurance Co. challenged the rule in the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.242  Although the court held that the
Commission had reasonably interpreted the exclusion for “annuity con-
tracts” as not exempting equity-indexed annuities, it vacated the rule be-
cause the Commission had “failed to properly consider the effect of the
rule upon efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”243
Removing doubt that equity-indexed annuities could be regulated
under the Securities Act, the court found that equity-indexed annuities
were more like securities than annuities that traditionally benefited from
the § 3(a)(8) exemption.244  Retail customers who purchased equity-in-
dexed annuities did not know their annual returns until the end of the year
resulting in variability in potential return and risk.245  As the court noted,
“[b]y contrast, an annuity contract falling under Rule 151’s exemption
avoids this variability by guaranteeing the interest rate ahead of time.”246
239. 17 C.F.R. § 230.151(b).
240. See Am. Equity, 613 F.3d at 170–71.
241. 17 CFR § 230.151A (a)(1)–(2) (2010).
242. Am. Equity, 613 F.3d.
243. Id. at 176, 179.
244. Id. at 174.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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The court also found that it was not necessary for the Commission to ac-
count for the marketing of the product in Rule 151A when determining
that the annuity fell outside the safe harbor of Rule 151.247  When the
Commission adopted Rule 151A, it found the inclusion of a marketing
factor unnecessary, explaining that “[w]here, as here, the essential charac-
teristic of the product bestows upon that product obvious securities-like
qualities, it is reasonable to assume that any marketing of the product
would correspondingly be securities-related.”248  Accordingly, equity-in-
dexed annuities were necessarily marketed as securities-like products be-
cause they were more like securities than other annuities.  For the
foregoing reasons, the court held that the Commission’s interpretation of
annuity contract was reasonable.249
3. Congress Weighs in on Equity-Indexed Annuities
Following the court’s decision, Congress weighed in on the matter
when it enacted Dodd-Frank.250  Title IX, Section 989J, also known as the
Harkin Amendment, directs the SEC to treat certain annuity contracts as
exempt securities under the Securities Act as long as certain conditions are
met.  This exemption covers equity-indexed annuities as long as:
(1) the value of the indexed annuity does not vary according to the perform-
ance of a separate account; . . . and
(3) the indexed annuity is issued in a state that has adopted the Model Suita-
bility Regulation or by an insurer that adopts and implements practices on a
nationwide basis for the sale of annuity contracts that meet or exceed the
NAIC Model Suitability Regulation.251
As discussed above, the NAIC’s Model Regulation tracks FINRA’s
suitability standard.  It requires that the Broker or Producer have “reason-
able grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for the
consumer on the basis of the facts disclosed by the consumer as to his or
her investments and other insurance products and as to his or her financial
situation and needs, including the consumer’s suitability information.”252
The Harkin Amendment assumed that by June 16, 2013, states would have
adopted the Model Regulation.  However, only about two-thirds of the
states have done so.253  Presently, it is unclear whether the SEC will retain
regulatory responsibility over equity-indexed annuities in those states that
have not adopted the Model Regulation.
247. Id. at 175.
248. Id. at 175–76.
249. Id.
250. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989J, 124 Stat. 1376, 1949-50 (2010).
251. FIO REPORT, supra note 63, at 52.
252. NAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 167, § 6.A.
253. See supra note 185.
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V. ISSUES REGULATING EQUITY-INDEXED ANNUITY SALES
While Congress, regulators, and industry participants debated how to
regulate equity-indexed annuities, financial advisers sold increasing num-
bers of them.  In 1998, the insurance industry sold about $4 billion of eq-
uity-indexed annuities.254  By 2007, annual sales grew to $24.8 billion, with
the overall number of equity-indexed annuity assets totaling $123 bil-
lion.255  The industry has continued to grow: in 2012, equity-indexed annu-
ity sales reached $34.2 billion with the overall number of equity-indexed
annuity assets ballooning to $224.7 billion.256
Yet these high sales numbers have long been followed by complaints
that the products were being sold to customers who did not need them.  In
2008, Commission Chairman Christopher Cox remarked that many equity-
indexed annuities “appear to have been marketed to investors who are
least able to scrutinize the details” and that many were sold to “older
Americans who are simply in many cases not suitable purchasers.”257
Some argue that equity-indexed annuities’ abnormally high commissions
induce Producers to sell the products to persons who do not need them.258
According to one report, the current average sales commission paid by
insurance companies to their agents for selling equity-indexed annuities is
6%.259  However, the sales commissions for certain equity-indexed annui-
ties may be even higher—ranging up to 12%.260  Additional incentives
may also exist; for example, some insurance companies have rewarded
Producers with free trips to Disney World in exchange for selling equity-
indexed annuity products.261  In many ways, these concerns about equity-
indexed annuity sales mirror larger concerns about the business of giving
investment advice generally.
A. Early Marketing and Sales
Equity-indexed annuities have been sold in troubling ways.  At one an-
nuity sales training seminar presented by “Annuity University,” the Wall
Street Journal found cause for concern.262  At the training, attendees were
254. See Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, supra note 21, at 8.
255. Id. at 9.
256. IRI FACTBOOK, supra note 22, at 164.
257. Cox, supra note 27.
258. Leslie Scism, Fixed Indexed Annuities Merit Caution, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2013,
8:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873234551045790147923192500
18.
259. Id.
260. Zeke Faux & Margaret Collins, Indexed Annuities Cap Gains, Obscure Fees as
Sellers Earn Trip to Disney, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2011-01-20/indexed-annuities-obscure-fees-as-sellers-earn-trip-to-disney.html.
261. Id.
262. Ellen E. Schultz & Jeff D. Opdyke, At Annuity University, Agents Learn How to
Pitch to Seniors, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 2, 2002), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10255618
02229705600.
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told that to sell to senior citizens, they should “[t]reat them like they’re
blind 12-year-olds” and that they should expect them to “buy based upon
emotions!  Emotions of fear, anger and greed.”263  Trainees were coached
to avoid giving technical descriptions of annuities.264  Instead, they were
told to give simpler answers.265  Tyrone Clark, the instructor at the train-
ing seminar claimed that instead of the “technical answer,” annuity sales-
persons should give “the senior answer. Tell them it’s like a CD—it’s safe,
it’s guaranteed.”266  This, of course, is simply not true.  Annuities and cer-
tificates of deposit are vastly different products.  At Annuity University,
trainees were taught to generate fear and make sales.267  They were told to
“[t]oss hand grenades into the advice to disturb the seniors” and that sell-
ing required “putting a pitchfork in their chest.”268
B. The 2005 FINRA Notice about Equity-Indexed Annuities
As concerns grew, FINRA issued a Notice to its Members in 2005,
addressing the responsibility of Brokers and firms when selling equity-in-
dexed annuities that had not been registered as securities.269  Specifically,
FINRA was concerned with the sales materials associated with unregis-
tered equity-indexed annuities because they did not fully and accurately
describe the products.  FINRA highlighted specific claims found in certain
marketing materials.  Some of the claims included:
• What if the market goes down and you would lose nothing? The market
goes up-you gain!
• A Win/Win Investment Vehicle!
• How Your Retirement Funds Can Have: Security of Principal, Higher Than
CD Rates of Interest, Opportunity for Growth (No Losses)
• Pick up where Social Security leaves off with NEW tax-deferred annui-
ties . . . featuring . . . 2 indexed accounts linked to a popular stock market
index.
• If you’re looking for upside potential and no market downside look no fur-
ther than [name of equity-indexed annuity]. This fixed annuity . . . enables
you to make the most of S&P 500 Index gains . . . .
• Growth Potential without Market Risk.270
Remarking on these advertisements, FINRA noted that these sales
materials could confuse or mislead investors.271  Given the products’ com-
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. NAT’L ASS’N. OF SEC. DEALERS, EQUITY INDEXED ANNUITIES, NOTICE TO MEM-
BERS 05-50 (2005), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/
documents/notices/p014821.pdf.
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plexity, FINRA was also concerned that some Brokers “might have diffi-
culty understanding all of the features of the product and determining the
extent to which those features meet the needs of the customer.”272
At the time, FINRA took no position on whether equity-indexed an-
nuities were securities.  However, much rode on the products’ classifica-
tion.  If the products were classified as securities, the law imposed
extensive supervisory obligations on firms with Brokers selling equity-in-
dexed annuities.  If the products were not securities, the sales could be
classified as outside business activities and would have to be supervised
accordingly.273
C. The NASAA Survey & the Commission’s First Senior Summit
In 2006, the North American Securities Administrators Association
(“NASAA”) conducted a survey of state securities regulators.274  The sur-
vey found that 44% of investor complaints received by regulators were
made by senior investors.275  The survey also found that unregistered se-
curities, variable annuities, and equity-indexed annuities were the most
pervasive financial products involved in senior investment fraud.276  Cases
involving variable or equity-indexed annuities represented an estimated
65% of the caseload in Massachusetts and 60% of the caseload in Hawaii
and Mississippi.277
NASAA presented much of this information to the Commission at its
first Seniors Summit in July 2006.278  In its presentation, NASAA made
clear that its concerns about equity-indexed annuities were not about
whether the products should be sold to the public, but about the ways in
which the products were “being pitched aggressively to seniors through
investment seminars.”279  In particular, NASAA was concerned that in-
vestors were not “always told about high surrender charges for early with-
drawal, the potential of exposure to market risk, and the steep sales
commissions agents often earn when they move investors into these
products.”280
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D. The Dateline NBC Investigation
In 2008, a Dateline NBC investigation into equity-indexed annuity
sales found a number of issues with how the products were being sold to
retail consumers.281  In particular, Dateline focused on how equity-in-
dexed annuities were being sold through so-called Free Lunch seminars.282
To induce people to attend, the seminar leaders sent invitations to an edu-
cational seminar to retirees and provided free food.  According to a study
by the Commission that focused on free lunch seminars presented by bro-
kerage firms, 100% of the seminars reviewed were designed primarily as
sales seminars and not to provide public education.283
Free Lunch seminars were often held at upscale hotels, restaurants,
retirement homes, and golf courses and offered invitees attractive induce-
ments, such as door prizes and prizes like tote bags and cruises.  The semi-
nar advertisements and mailers were often designed to imply urgency,
using phrases such as “Act Now!” and “Seating is Limited!”284  Some of
the advertisements and mailers used scare tactics that targeted seniors,
such as, “If you’re retired, YOU’RE A TARGET and you cannot afford to
miss this workshop!” and “How to Protect your Nest Egg from The Re-
tirement Vultures.”285  The seminars had titles such as “Senior Financial
Survival Seminar” and “Senior Financial Safety Workshop.”286  The finan-
cial advisors presenting the seminars sometimes used titles that repre-
sented that they had some special training, knowledge, or certification,
such as “Certified Senior Advisor,” “Elder Care Asset Protection Special-
ist,” or “Chartered Retirement Planning Counselor.”287  Free Lunch semi-
nars continue to be an issue for retail customers.  Although not all
seminars sell equity-indexed annuities, Free Lunch seminars are wide-
spread and about 64% of investors surveyed by FINRA in 2013 in the 40+
age group received at least one invitation to a Free Lunch seminar.288
281. See Chris Hansen, Tricks of the Trade (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 13, 2008),
available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/24095230/ns/dateline_nbc/t/tricks-trade/#.U4TbM_ld
Uso (broadcast transcript) [hereinafter Dateline Transcript].
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“Free Lunch” Sales Seminars (Sept. 2007), available at  http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/seniors/
freelunchreport.pdf.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. Although a third of those surveyed said they attended a seminar, only 4% had
lost money as a result. Id. This 4% figure likely understates the true scope of senior losses.
Seniors purchasing equity-indexed annuities will only lose principal when forced to withdraw
funds before the surrender charge period expires. Seniors may be less aware of the opportu-
nity cost losses flowing from their purchases of these products. By owning an equity-indexed
annuity instead of a portfolio of securities, seniors may accumulate substantially less wealth
than they would had their assets been appropriately allocated.
Fall 2014] The Fragmented Regulation of Investment Advice 83
Although anecdotal, Dateline NBC’s investigation into one equity-in-
dexed annuity sales seminar at an Alabama steak house found the sales-
person making troubling claims and seemingly attempting to scare
attendees into purchasing an equity-indexed annuity.289  After claiming
that he had “no agenda when [he] see[s] people,” the equity-indexed an-
nuity salesman began by questioning whether bank deposits guaranteed by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) were safe.290  He
claimed that the FDIC’s financial strength had been rated and received an
“F-minus” mark.291  Shortly afterward he claimed that with an equity-in-
dexed annuity, the attendees’ accounts would never go down and could
only go up.292  The salesperson did not mention that seniors could lose up
to 18% if they needed to remove their money before the multi-year sur-
render period expired.293  The Dateline transcript also does not reveal
whether the salesperson disclosed the amount he would receive as a sales
commission.
E. Continuing Investigations
Concerns about unsuitable and exploitative insurance sales have
caused some state regulators to take action.  As explained above, state
securities administrators often do not have direct regulatory authority
over Producers because they are regulated by the insurance commission-
ers.294  However, when recommending that an investor purchase an insur-
ance product, such as a fixed annuity or an equity-indexed annuity,
Producers will sometimes recommend that investors liquidate other invest-
ments.  Depending on the advice given, the Producer may stray across the
regulatory boundary between insurance and securities and act as unregis-
tered investment adviser by advising a client to sell securities to purchase
insurance.
In 2008, the Missouri Securities Division pursued an insurance agent
for selling three fixed annuities and one equity-indexed annuity to an eld-
erly investor.295  The insurance agent, Terry Simpkins, recommended the
liquidation of the majority of the securities in the investor’s two brokerage
accounts to fund the purchase of two of the annuities.296  The other two
annuities were funded by the liquidation of bank certificates of deposit.297
Simpkins received commissions from the sale of the annuities.298  The Se-
289. See Dateline Transcript, supra note 281.
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curities Commissioner considered this compensation for investment advice
without being registered as an investment adviser as a violation of the Mis-
souri state statutes.299  Accordingly, the Enforcement Division sought civil
penalties totaling $30,000 for multiple statutory violations.300
In 2010, the Illinois Securities Department pursued an insurance agent,
Jeffrey Hum, for selling equity-indexed annuities to elderly investors.301
One of the investors had a $1 million dollar diversified portfolio invested
in stocks and bonds, which Hum reallocated into four equity-indexed an-
nuities, liquidated, and then reinvested in other equity-indexed annui-
ties.302  Hum engaged in similar conduct on behalf of an elderly couple.303
The Secretary of State found that Hum’s activities constituted the activi-
ties of an investment adviser and that he had failed to register as an invest-
ment adviser representative in violation of Illinois law.304  As a result, he
was permanently prohibited from offering or selling securities in
Illinois.305
State enforcement responses have targeted insurance companies as
well as Producers.  State regulators in California, Minnesota, and other
states settled cases with insurance companies involving allegations that
their representatives were misleadingly selling equity-indexed annui-
ties.306  For example, Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America,
a market leader in equity-indexed annuities, settled a host of cases with
state regulators alleging that it had incentivized unsuitable sales.307  Al-
though Allianz did not admit to any wrongdoing in the settlement, as part
of the settlement it agreed to maintain an “Agent Oversight Program” to
review its agents’ behavior.308
VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM
The divergent standards and regulatory structures detailed above re-
veal that the current retail customer protections are insufficient and gener-
ate unnecessary confusion and complexity.  A federal statute—an
Investment Advice Act—would provide much needed uniformity and con-
sistency in this area.  The driving principle behind the Act should be that
personalized investment advice should be regulated consistently, rather
than being regulated based on compensation structure or the type of prod-
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uct being sold.  To guide efforts to frame such an Act, Part VI sketches
considerations in broad strokes.  At least, great care should be taken to
ensure that any such federal act has: (A) a sufficiently broad scope; (B) an
administrative agency charged with coordinated implementation, interpre-
tation, and enforcement; and much needed reforms to (C) compensation
structures and disclosures, and (D) sales practice regulations.
A. Scope Considerations
To prove effective, an Investment Advice Act must have a sufficiently
broad scope to cover financial advisers providing investment advice to re-
tail customers.  Many life insurance products that are sold for investment
purposes rather than insurances purposes should fall within the scope of
the Act.  For example, the Act should cover advice about equity-indexed
annuities, whole life insurance, universal life insurance, variable life insur-
ance, variable annuities, and fixed annuities.309  Instead of regulating by
compensation structure or particular type of product sold, the Act should
apply to financial advisers—persons who hold themselves out as providing
investment advice to the public.  At the least, the definition of financial
adviser should encompass today’s Brokers, Advisers, and Producers sell-
ing life insurance products with investment objectives.
However, an Investment Advice Act should not attempt to regulate
every insurance transaction.  For instance, Producers sell a wide range of
products, including life insurance products and property and casualty in-
surance products.  There seems no reason to extend the Act to cover prop-
erty and casualty insurance products, which do not implicate the same
concerns that the sale of other certain insurance products do.
B. Appropriate Administrative Consolidation, Oversight & Enforcement
Coherent administrative oversight of an Investment Advice Act will
reduce coordination costs and improve investor protection.  Yet, should
the Act be administered by a particular existing federal agency or should a
new administrative agency be created?  While a strong case could be made
for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Commission is the
leading candidate to assume authority as the primary federal administra-
tive agency enforcing an Investment Advice Act.310  In the view of the
authors, the Commission should at least be tasked with broad oversight
authority for licensing, examinations, and enforcement.311  Notwithstand-
ing the proposal for a federal system of regulation, there remains a role for
state regulators within these areas.
309. Variable life insurance and variable annuities are hybrid security products that re-
quire individuals to be both insurance licensed and securities licensed.
310. As insurance has historically been regulated solely at the state level, no federal
agency is adequately equipped to assume the task.
311. Under this regulatory scheme, the Commission may delegate day-to-day oversight
to a self-regulatory body, such as FINRA; however, the Commission itself would retain pri-
mary responsibility for implementation of the statutory and regulatory scheme.
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1. Licensing & Examinations
A coherent and harmonious national regulatory framework offers sub-
stantial benefits.  Today, Advisers, Brokers, and Producers are qualified
and licensed by separate entities even though their advice concerns the
same subject.  These entities impose different standards for persons to
qualify to give financial advice.  Generally, Brokers and Producers must
pass exams to become licensed.312  The exams test knowledge of the rules
that the individual will be subject to and the basics about the products that
may be sold with the license.313  As discussed in Part III.A.1 supra, Advis-
ers need only register with the Commission or the states in which they will
be doing business, depending on the size of their operation.
An Investment Advice Act should provide for uniform qualification,
examination, and licensing of financial advisers and administration of ex-
aminations by a national regulator, such as FINRA.  Because competent
investment advice requires a broad understanding of the modern financial
landscape, persons authorized to give investment advice under the Act
should be required to demonstrate a certain minimum understanding of
the characteristics of different asset classes.  At a minimum, financial ad-
visers should be required to understand basic financial products and the
wide range of possible investments available to clients.  For example, indi-
viduals should be competent to provide advice about the general charac-
teristics of stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and annuities.  Establishing a
minimum competency baseline for financial advisers would solve many of
the current problems flowing from our current, fragmented structure.  As
discussed in Part III supra, Producers today may not advise retail custom-
ers to sell securities in order to purchase insurance products if they are not
licensed to give advice about securities.  When it is in a customer’s best
interest, a financial adviser should be able to recommend moving assets
from one class of investment to another without running afoul of the law.
This may only be done if all persons qualified under an Investment Advice
Act have demonstrated core competencies and an understanding of the
roles played by different asset classes.
Additional exams should also be mandated, as appropriate, to qualify
financial advisers to recommend specific categories of products, such as
low-priced securities, options, annuities, and municipal securities.  This
would serve to ensure basic subject matter knowledge and competency.
While a national regulator, such as FINRA, should serve as the central
licensing authority to establish and administer the exams, each state
should retain the ability to approve or deny registration in the individual
state.
312. See FINRA Registration and Examination Requirements, FIN. INDUS. REGULA-
TORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/Registration/QualificationsExams/
Qualifications/p011051 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
313. See, e.g., id.; NY Insurance Exam Outline, PROMETRIC, https://www.prometric
.com/en-us/clients/NewYork/Pages/exam-content.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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2. Enforcement
Regulations only have meaning if they are enforced.  Today, different
enforcement mechanisms police the behavior of Brokers, Advisers, and
Producers.  While “FINRA conducts examinations of 55 percent of all
broker-dealers every year,” Advisers are examined much less fre-
quently.314  Because states regulate Producers, there is greater variation
nationally.  These oversight disparities would be greatly reduced by sub-
jecting all financial advisers to the same regime.  While the task may be
too great for the Commission’s current resources, FINRA’s resources
would effectively supplement the Commission’s authority.  Already over-
seeing Brokers, FINRA could be charged with the primary responsibility
for overseeing all financial advisers giving investment advice.  Because
FINRA’s current country-wide uniform system of regulation now oversees
the brokerage industry, much of what this Article proposes would simply
extend and slightly modify the existing system of regulation.
To achieve its core purpose, an Investment Advice Act need not dis-
place the extensive system of state regulation currently in effect.  Rather,
this structure would overlay the current state system in the same way the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act overlaid the existing state layer of
securities regulation in the 1930s.  This federal system would create a na-
tional floor, so to speak, with states retaining their ability to enforce the
regulations and discipline financial advisers within their jurisdiction.
C. Compensation Reforms
Sensible compensation reforms would more closely link compensation
to services provided.  Compensation has long been a source of conflict for
individuals providing investment advice.315  The transaction-based fees se-
cured by Brokers and Producers and the asset-based fees secured by Ad-
visers create conflicts, albeit of a different sort.  The proliferation of
indirect fees for investment advice further complicates today’s compensa-
tion structures.  For example, customers may not pay any up-front charges
when they purchase an annuity, but the Brokers and Producers may still
receive a commission.316  The customer may mistakenly believe that the
Broker or the Producer has not made any money from the transaction,
when in reality they have secured a rather high fee, perhaps 7%.  When
the Exchange Act and the Advisers Act were enacted, compensation was
more closely tied to the services offered.  Brokers were paid commissions
to execute transactions and Advisers were paid for advice.317  It was ex-
314. See Wrona, supra note 124, at 42.
315. See COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RE-
PORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES 7 (1995), available at http://www
.sec.gov/news/studies/bkrcomp.txt.
316. See NASAA Informed Investor Alert: Annuities, N. AM. SEC. ADMINISTRATORS
ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/2692/informed-investor-alert-annuities/.
317. Lazaro, supra note 14, at 398.
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plicitly assumed that Brokers were not receiving any compensation for the
advice they were giving, to the extent they were giving customers any ad-
vice.  Today, that distinction no longer exists.318  Brokers are expected to
give advice, such as a recommendation to purchase an investment.  The
commission compensation that Brokers receive must cover this service in
addition to the execution of the transaction, especially in light of the fact
that most of their time is spent providing advice, not executing transac-
tions.319  Producers likewise often receive compensation indirectly from
the insurance companies for the products they sell.320
Astoundingly, the current system defines the parameters of the rela-
tionship between investment adviser and retail customer primarily on the
basis of the manner in which fees are charged.321  When an individual
charges an asset-based fee, the law recognizes that the individual is being
paid for advice.322  When the same individual charges a commission, the
law effectively pretends that the individual is being paid for executing a
transaction without any further investigation into the relationship between
the investor and the individual providing advice.  These criteria are flawed.
The parameters of the relationship should not be defined by the fee charg-
ing method.
An Investment Advice Act should solve this problem by tying compen-
sation to the services offered rather than the product sold.  The duties
owed to the customer should not be artificially determined solely on the
basis of the type of fee charged to the retail customer.  To make the nature
of the payment clearer, the current commission-based structure should be
fundamentally restructured to limit most indirect payments for investment
advice.  Rather, fees paid for investment advice should be separated from
the costs associated with the transactions and paid separately.  To regulate
the financial advice business within their own borders, other nations have
already moved in this direction: for example, the United Kingdom and
Australia recently introduced radical reforms to govern the provision of
financial advice.323  The new Australian structure expressly requires regu-
lated persons to act in the best interests of their clients, bans certain forms
318. Id. at 382.
319. See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 13, at 10–11.
320. Leslie Scism, Insurance Fees, Revealed, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2012, 5:08 PM) http:/
/online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304177104577305930202770336.
321. See Lazaro, supra note 14, at 413 (arguing that the standards for investment advice
should not vary based on how the fee is charged).
322. See Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
323. Francis J. Facciolo, Introduction, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 297, 299 (2013) (“The
United Kingdom and Australia have also been pursuing radical reforms of the regulation of
financial advice given to retail customers. The purpose of these reforms is to restrict compen-
sation practices for investment advisers that might influence the advice that they give to retail
customers because of their compensation arrangements with financial product producers.”).
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of conflicted compensation, and requires clients to affirmatively opt-in to
ongoing fees.324
Bringing these fees into the light would do much good.  It would re-
duce the incentive for financial advisers to recommend one product over
another on the basis of fees because the fees involved would be more
transparent.  Complexity and obscurity in financial products tends to favor
the interests of issuers over retail customers.325  Still, it may be appropri-
ate to pay financial advisers an asset-based fee if they provide advice on an
on-going basis.  To the extent financial advisers are paid by issuers of
products, the precise amounts of those payments must be fully and trans-
parently disclosed to the retail customer prior to the completion of the
sale.  Such payments present potential conflicts of interest that should be
disclosed to retail customers.
D. Consistent Standards for Advisory Services
Today, Advisers, Brokers, and Producers are held to different sales
practice standards.  Advisers are held to a federal fiduciary standard re-
quiring them to act in the best interests of their clients and avoid or dis-
close most conflicts of interest.  Brokers are held to a suitability standard:
they must recommend investments that are appropriate for their clients.
Most conflicts of interest are disclosed to the customer, many at the con-
clusion of the sale of the investment.  Producers are generally held to a
similar standard if they are selling an annuity; however, depending on the
state they are in they may be held to a lesser standard, including no stan-
dard at all.
An Investment Advice Act should impose new standards for financial
advisers based on the services offered and the advice-giver’s relationship
with to the retail customer.  There should be a more coherent framework
with three different tiers of obligations for most financial advisers. Within
this framework, conflicts of interest should be handled differently for each
service tier.
1. Tier 1: Transaction-Based – Execution-Only
Within the first tier, the transaction-based – execution-only tier, finan-
cial advisers would only provide execution services.  In other words, the
retail customer would not be given any investment advice.  For example,
this tier would include firms that offer online accounts where the retail
customer places trades based on his or her own research.  Presumably,
each trade placed would incur a fee based on the costs to the firm to exe-
324. Richard Batten & Gail Pearson, Financial Advice in Australia: Principles to Pro-
scription; Managing to Banning, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 511 (2013).
325. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 22 (2013)
(“In general, the increased complexity of such debt products can favor issuers over
investors . . . .”).
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cute the transaction.  This should be the lowest cost option for retail
customers.
Within this tier, financial firms should be held to a very limited fiduci-
ary duty in the execution of the transaction.  This would encompass the
current concepts of best execution, fair prices reasonably related to the
market, full disclosure as to the terms of execution, and disclosure of any
potential conflicts of interest, such as payment for order flow, market-
maker services, or principal transactions.
2. Tier 2: Transaction-Based – Advice
Within the second tier, the transaction-based – advice tier, financial
advisers would provide similar execution services to Tier 1, but retail cus-
tomers would also be able to obtain advice in connection with transactions
from an appropriately licensed financial adviser.  With this tier, the com-
pensation would be transaction-based.  There would not be any expecta-
tion of an ongoing relationship between the financial adviser and the retail
customer.  The financial adviser would be held to a limited fiduciary stan-
dard that would encompass the same duties as Tier 1 but with additional
duties.  In this tier, recommendations to buy or sell investments should be
in the best interests of the retail customer, and the financial adviser should
be required to place the retail customer’s interests ahead of the adviser’s
own interests.
Conflicts of interest would inevitably still arise and how financial advis-
ers deal these conflicts would depend on the type of conflict.  Any Invest-
ment Advice Act should take great care to minimize conflicts of interest
flowing from transaction-based fees.  While clearer and more transparent
disclosure of fees for advisory services would do much to reduce conflicts
of interest, adequate supervision structures will need to be maintained to
police behavior.
3. Tier 3: Full Service – Ongoing Management
The third and highest tier, the full service – ongoing management tier,
would provide for the highest level of service by financial advisers and
duties owed to customers.  Financial advisers operating at this level would
provide on-going management services, advice, and monitoring of the in-
vestments within the retail customer’s account.  Asset-based compensation
would be permissible within this tier of service.  To avoid confusion, firms
should not be permitted to hold themselves out as full service unless all of
their affiliated personnel were held to the highest standards.  The duties of
the first two tiers would be incorporated here and the financial adviser
would be held to the highest fiduciary duty, requiring the adviser to put
the retail customer’s interests ahead of his own.  Additionally, the finan-
cial advisers would be required to monitor the retail customer’s account
and make recommendations as appropriate to address changes in market
conditions.
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To the extent possible, conflicts of interest should be avoided entirely.
Persons providing services within this tier should not be permitted to re-
ceive additional compensation from issuers of products in addition to the
compensation received from the retail customers for managing their ac-
counts.  Financial advisers should also be required to disclose other con-
flicts, such as their firm having inventory in the same investment, and
receive the retail customer’s acknowledgement of a conflict at the time of
the recommendation, not when the sale is completed.
It may also be appropriate to hold financial advisers operating within a
lower tier to the standards of a higher tier.  Financial advisers should not
be able to operate within one tier while marketing and holding themselves
out as providing a higher tier of services.  If a financial adviser’s conduct
would lead a reasonable retail customer to believe that he or she was en-
gaging an individual in a higher tier, the higher level of standards should
apply.
VII. CONCLUSION
Current debates about whether Brokers should be bound by the same
fiduciary duties as Advisers largely miss the insurance side of the story.  In
part, the partitioning of the securities and insurance businesses into sepa-
rate regulatory regimes may be the cause.  While these separate regulatory
regimes may have once made sense, their wisdom now appears suspect.
New financial products, such as equity-indexed annuities, challenge the
traditional divisions between securities and insurance products.  As these
worlds increasingly intermingle, the need for a coherent regulatory struc-
ture will increase.
The securities laws were initially enacted to protect investors, which
they achieved through disclosure and regulation that set forth standards of
conduct.  Unfortunately, retail customers remain at risk, indicating that
either disclosure is ineffective or the standards of conduct themselves are
inadequate.  The insurance laws, in contrast, have unclear objectives and
lack uniformity across the country in how they protect retail customers.
The result is investment advice arbitrage: a financial adviser is able to de-
termine what standard of conduct the adviser will be held to by choosing
to sell the client a particular investment product or offering the client a
particular fee structure, regardless of what investment product or fee
structure is best for the client.  This state of regulation is not investor pro-
tection; it has abandoned the maxim President Roosevelt put forth 80
years ago and returned the investment advice industry to the pre-Depres-
sion era of caveat emptor.
This Article proposes a solution, an Investment Advice Act, that will
eliminate the opportunity for arbitrage by unifying the systems of over-
sight into a single scheme of legislation.  Under this solution, financial ad-
visers will no longer be able to manipulate regulation structures to their
advantage rather than that of their clients.  Under the proposed Invest-
ment Advice Act, a financial adviser’s standards of conduct will now be
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directly tied to the level of investment advice given to the retail customer
and will no longer be connected to the product sold or the compensation
received.  Under this new scheme, the financial adviser’s duty will be clear
before the financial adviser speaks, rather than determined after the ad-
vice has been given and a product or fee structure chosen.  In some re-
spects, the financial industry already supports changes to the standards
governing Brokers and Advisers.  The Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association (“SIMFA”) supports the adoption of a uniform fidu-
ciary standard; however it remains concerned about the potential costs as-
sociated with adopting such a standard.326  SIMFA has not yet
contemplated the adoption of a standard which would also integrate insur-
ance products.  The Investment Advice Act would address some of these
concerns about the costs associated with uniform standards by preserving
options for the financial advisers.  Financial advisers will be able to offer
low cost options, such as execution-only services or transaction-based ad-
vice.  The proposed Act is not a one-size-fits-all model, but rather, one
that allows tailoring to several different business models.
As the Baby Boomer generation ages and depends more on financial
advisers to manage its wealth, the proper regulation of investment advice
becomes more urgent.  While the task of reforming the regulation of in-
vestment advice in the United States is monumental, reforms have been
successfully adopted abroad.327  There is hope that, with investor advo-
cates and the financial industry working together, successful reforms may
be adopted in the United States as well.
326. See SIFMA Comment Letter on Duties of Brokers, Dealers and Investment Ad-
visers (July 5, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-3128.pdf
327. See Part VI.C. above.
